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Review Essay

The Doctrine of Discovery
Reconsidered: Reflecting on Discovering
Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of
Discovery in the English Colonies, by
Robert J Miller, Jacinta Ruru, Larissa
Behrendt, and Tracey Lindberg,1 and
Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal
Nations and Canada, by Felix Hoehn2
KENT MCNEIL3
THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT that the Indigenous nations in North America,

Australia, and New Zealand were factually independent and sovereign prior
to the arrival of Europeans.4 They occupied specific territories and had viable
1.
2.
3.
4.

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) [Miller et al, Discovering Indigenous Lands].
(Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2012) [Hoehn, Reconciling
Sovereignties].
Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I would like to thank John Borrows,
Kathy Simo, Kerry Wilkins, and John Wunder for reading and providing very helpful
feedback on drafts of this essay.
De facto sovereignty does not require acknowledgement by any particular legal system, nor
does it depend on Eurocentric conceptions of sovereignty. See Kent McNeil, “Factual and
Legal Sovereignty in North America: Indigenous Realities and Euro-American Pretensions”
in Julie Evans et al, eds, Sovereignty: Frontiers of Possibility (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i
Press, 2013) 37 [McNeil, “Factual and Legal Sovereignty”].
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social, political, and legal systems that suited their needs and were adapted to the
circumstances in which they lived.5 Consequently, the European powers should
not have been able to acquire territorial sovereignty by original means such as
discovery and settlement; instead, sovereignty would have had to be acquired
derivatively from the Indigenous nations by conquest or cession.6 With the
exception of Australia, the British Crown’s acceptance of this was to some extent
confirmed by the fact that it entered into numerous treaties with the Indigenous
peoples, which can be regarded as acknowledgement of their sovereign status.7
And yet for many years the highest courts in the four settler nations of the United
States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have relied, explicitly or implicitly,
on the so-called discovery doctrine that was judicially articulated by Chief Justice
Marshall of the United States Supreme Court in his seminal 1823 decision in

5.

6.

7.

Even in the European law of nations up to the nineteenth century, this would have been
sufficient for them to have sovereignty. See e.g. Michel Morin, L’Usurpation de la souverainté
autochtone: Le cas des peoples de la Nouvelle-France et des colonies anglaises de l’Amérique du
Nord (Montréal: Boréal, 1997) at 31-62; Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations; or, Principles
of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (1758),
translated by Joseph Chitty (London: S Sweet, 1834), § 206. Vattel observes that “[i]f
a number of free families, scattered over an independent country, come to unite for the
purpose of forming a nation or state, they all together acquire the sovereignty over the whole
country they inhabit.”
See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, [1975] ICJ Rep 12 [Western Sahara]. In international
and British colonial law at the relevant time, the principal means by which territorial
sovereignty could be acquired were occupation/settlement and conquest/cession. See DP
O’Connell, International Law, 2nd ed (London: Stevens & Sons, 1970) vol 1 at 408-17;
James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012) at 220-29; Charles James Tarring, Chapters on the Law Relating to
the Colonies, 4th ed (London: Stevens & Haynes, 1913) at 3-24; Kenneth Roberts-Wray,
Commonwealth and Colonial Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1966) at 99-112. For critical
discussion, see Patrick Macklem, “What is International Human Rights Law? Three
Applications of a Distributive Account” (2007) 52:3 McGill LJ 575 at 590-94.
See Robert A Williams, Jr, Linking Arms Together: American Indian Treaty Visions of Law and
Peace, 1600-1800 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Michael Belgrave et al, eds,
Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi (South Melbourne: Oxford University
Press, 2005); James (Sa’ke’j) Youngblood Henderson, Treaty Rights in the Constitution of
Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2007).
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Johnson v M’Intosh.8 Why is legal doctrine so at odds with reality and historical
practice, as well as with current standards of equality of peoples?
In Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English
Colonies, four leading Indigenous scholars critically analyze and assess the origins
and application of the doctrine of discovery in these four settler states. Robert
Miller, a citizen of the Eastern Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma and professor at Lewis
and Clark Law School in Portland, Oregon, introduces the subject and examines
the legal adoption and historical application of the doctrine in the United States.
Tracey Lindberg, a Cree citizen (Neheyiwak) from the Kelly Lake Cree Nation,
professor of law at the University of Ottawa, and professor of Indigenous Studies
at Athabasca University, writes about the doctrine of discovery in Canada. Larissa
Behrendt, a Eualeyai/Gamillaroi woman and professor of law and director of
research at the Jumbunna Indigenous House of Learning at the University of
Technology in Sydney, assesses the use of the doctrine in Australia. Jacinta Ruru,
a senior lecturer in law at the University of Otago who is of Ngati Raukawa
(Waikato), Ngati Rangi, and Pakeha descent, examines the application of the
doctrine in Aotearoa/New Zealand and concludes the book with a comparison of
discovery in these former English colonies.
In this review essay, it is not my intention to summarize the history and
case law that the authors of Discovering Indigenous Lands have so ably presented
and critiqued. They have amply demonstrated how the doctrine of discovery has
been used in the settler states to attempt to justify the Crown’s acquisition of
sovereignty and lands and to legitimize the continuing domination of Indigenous
peoples by the four nation-states after they achieved independence from Britain.
In so doing, the authors have gone far beyond previous critiques of the doctrine

8.

21 US (8 Wheat) 543, 5 L Ed 681 (1823) [Johnson cited to Wheat]. For relatively recent
affirmation of the doctrine of discovery in the United States, see County of Oneida, New
York v Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, 470 US 226 at 434, 105 S Ct 1245 (1985),
referred to in City of Sherrill v Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 US 197 at 203 n1,
125 S Ct 1478 (2005). The Supreme Court of Canada, however, has recently begun to
distance itself from the discovery doctrine. See infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
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that have tended to focus on one jurisdiction, typically the United States.9 Their
comparative approach and comprehensive analysis are what make Discovering
Indigenous Lands such a significant contribution to our understanding of how law
has been used to justify British colonization and the continuing impact this has
had on the Indigenous peoples in the settler states discussed in the book.
Felix Hoehn’s book, Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal Nations and Canada,
was published after Discovering Indigenous Lands. As the title indicates, the focus
is on Canada and the tension between pre-existing Indigenous sovereignty
and unilateral Crown assertion of sovereignty. Like the authors of Discovering
Indigenous Lands, Hoehn concludes that the doctrine of discovery is premised on
notions of European superiority that are inherently racist and have no place in
modern-day Canada. However, Hoehn’s book is the more forward looking and
optimistic of the two. Relying on the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2004 decisions
in Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests)10 and Taku River Tlingit
First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director),11 and the distinction
Chief Justice McLachlin drew in her judgments in those cases between de facto
and de jure sovereignty, he suggests that a paradigm shift in legal thinking is
underway in which the doctrine of discovery has no place. He argues that this
shift could lead to a reconciliation of Indigenous and Crown sovereignty in a
reconstructed Canada that is no longer based on racist premises.
My modest goals in this review essay are two-fold: first, to support the
conclusions of the authors of Discovering Indigenous Lands that the doctrine
of discovery as formulated by Chief Justice Marshall is seriously flawed and
to argue that even his flawed formulation has been misapplied in subsequent
jurisprudence; and second, to assess Hoehn’s contention that the Supreme Court
of Canada (SCC) has already abandoned the doctrine and is moving towards a
position that is more respectful of the pre-existing sovereignty of the Indigenous
peoples and their present right to govern themselves and their territories. My
9.

See e.g. Vine Deloria, Jr, Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of
Independence (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985) at 85-111; David E Wilkins &
K Tsianina Lomawaima, Uneven Ground: American Indian Sovereignty and Federal Law
(Norman, Okla: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001) at 19-63; Frank Pommersheim,
Broken Landscape: Indians, Indian Tribes, and the Constitution (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2009) at 88-115. For recent articles focusing on other jurisdictions, see Jennifer Reid,
“The Doctrine of Discovery and Canadian Law” (2010) 30:2 Can J Native Stud 335; Blake
A Watson, “The Impact of the American Doctrine of Discovery on Native Land Rights in
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand” (2011) 34:2 Seattle UL Rev 507 [Watson, “Impact of
the Doctrine of Discovery”].
10. 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511 [Haida Nation].
11. 2004 SCC 74, [2004] 3 SCR 550 [Taku River].
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focus is therefore on the application of the doctrine of discovery in North America
and its present-day relevance to Canada in particular.

I. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL AND THE DOCTRINE OF
DISCOVERY
Johnson, the case in which the doctrine of discovery emerged as a legal concept in
American law, involved rival claims to approximately 43,000 square miles of land
north of the Ohio River in what became the states of Illinois and Indiana. The
land had been purchased by the Illinois and Wabash Companies from the Illinois
and Piankeshaw Indian Nations in 1773 and 1775, at a time when Great Britain
claimed sovereignty over the territory where the lands are located. Britain’s claim
to sovereignty was based primarily on the Treaty of Paris of 1763, whereby it had
acquired La Nouvelle France, which allegedly extended southwest from the Great
Lakes to the Mississippi River.12 France’s claim to sovereignty over the region was
based on discovery, exploration, and symbolic acts of possession, which were
followed by the establishment of a few forts and settlements, mainly along the
Mississippi River.13 As a result of the American Revolution and the 1783 Treaty
of Paris, Britain’s claim to this region passed to the United States. Pursuant to
its policy of purchasing lands from the Indian nations, the US government, by
treaty with the Illinois and Piankeshaw Nations, acquired the same lands that
had been purchased by the Illinois and Wabash Companies prior to the American
Revolution. The government then granted some of these lands to private persons,
giving rise to the rival claims that were the subject of the litigation in Johnson.14

12. French Louisiana, including New Orleans and territory on the west side of the Mississippi
River, had been ceded by France to Spain by the Treaty of Fontainebleau in 1762.
13. In 1682, La Salle had descended the Mississippi to its mouth and claimed the entire
watershed on behalf of the King of France. See e.g. John W Monette, History of the Discovery
and Settlement of the Valley of the Mississippi, by the Three Great European Powers, Spain,
France and Great Britain, vol 1 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1846) at 144; John
Anthony Caruso, The Mississippi Valley Frontier: The Age of French Exploration and Settlement
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966) at 159-81; Carl J Ekberg, French Roots in the
Illinois Country: The Mississippi Valley Frontier in Colonial Times (Urbana, Ill: University of
Illinois Press, 1998) at 22.
14. This summary is a simplification of a complex series of events leading up to the litigation.
See Eric Kades, “History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v. M’Intosh” (2001)
19:1 L & Hist Rev 67; Lindsay G Robertson, Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of America
Dispossessed Indigenous Peoples of Their Lands (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005)
[Robertson, Conquest by Law].
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Chief Justice Marshall decided that the purchases of the lands of the
Illinois and Piankeshaw Nations by the Illinois and Wabash Companies
were unenforceable in the courts of the United States for three reasons. First,
discovery of parts of North America by Europeans gave the discovering nation an
underlying title to the land and an exclusive right to purchase the Indians’ right
of occupancy. Second, if these lands were purchased under the laws of the Illinois
and Piankeshaw Nations, the purchases were subsequently annulled by the sale
of the same lands by these nations to the United States and could not be enforced
in American courts. Third, the British Crown had prohibited private purchases of
Indian lands by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and this proclamation applied
to the lands in question in 1773 and 1775. For the purposes of this review, our
discussion will be limited to analyzing the first of these reasons.
Chief Justice Marshall began his exposition of the discovery doctrine by
explaining that, on discovery of North America, “the great nations of Europe
were eager to appropriate to themselves so much of it as they could respectively
acquire.”15 But given that they all were in pursuit of basically the same
objective, he said that
it was necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war
with each other, to establish a principle, which all should acknowledge as the law
by which the right of acquisition, which they all asserted, should be regulated as
between themselves. This principle was, that discovery gave title to the government
by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European
governments, which title might be consummated by possession.16

Chief Justice Marshall went on to say that, because the discovering nation
was legally entitled to exclude all other Europeans from the discovered territory,
it had “the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives, and establishing
settlements upon it.”17 Moreover, the pre-existing sovereignty and land rights of
the Indian nations were impaired:
They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as
just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion;
but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever
they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave
exclusive title to those who made it.18

15.
16.
17.
18.

Johnson, supra note 8 at 572.
Ibid at 573.
Ibid.
Ibid at 574. See also ibid at 603.
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The Chief Justice then went a step further, asserting that the discovering
nation, because it had “the ultimate dominion,” also had “a power to grant the soil,
while yet in possession of the natives. These grants have been understood by all,
to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.”19
In five short paragraphs, Chief Justice Marshall thus laid down some of the
fundamental legal principles that still determine the rights of the Indian nations
in the United States. He dealt first with European acquisition of territorial
sovereignty, which was achieved by discovery, subject only to the apparent
qualification that this title needed to be “consummated by possession.”20
Discovery also gave the government of the European nation on whose behalf
it was made the exclusive right to acquire land from the Indian nations. While
this would have been sufficient for Chief Justice Marshall to conclude that the
private purchases from the Illinois and Piankeshaw Nations were invalid, he
nonetheless went on to hold that the European nation also acquired title to the
land by discovery, reducing pre-existing Indian rights to a right of occupancy.21
For this reason, the European nation could validly grant Indian lands, thus
conveying a good title to the grantee that would be subject to the Indian right of
occupancy.22 After the American Declaration of Independence, this authority to
grant passed to the individual States, and then to the United States in the western
regions that were ceded by States to the United States after the ratification of the
Constitution in 1789.23

19. Ibid at 574.
20. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
21. See Blake A Watson, “The Doctrine of Discovery and the Elusive Definition of Indian
Title” (2011) 15:4 Lewis & Clark L Rev 995 [Watson, “Doctrine of Discovery”]. Chief
Justice Marshall’s reliance on a supposed doctrine of international law to explain the British
Crown’s underlying title to Indian lands has been effectively critiqued by Howard Highland,
who argues that the Crown’s title to land in the Thirteen Colonies prior to the American
Revolution should have been derived from the domestic law doctrine of tenure rather than
the doctrine of discovery, but the unpopularity of feudal-based tenure in the young republic
would have made that explanation unpalatable for the Chief Justice. See Howard Highland,
Constitutional Realism and Third Party Property Rights in Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia
and Oneida Nation v. New York (LLM Thesis, York University, Osgoode Hall Law School,
2011) [unpublished] at 92-123.
22. In the English law that applied in the American colonies, what would have been granted
was a fee simple estate, but in remainder after the Indian right of occupancy rather than in
possession. This had already been suggested by the Marshall Court in Fletcher v Peck, 10 US
(6 Cranch) 87, 3 L Ed 162 (1810) [Fletcher cited to Cranch]. This decision was affirmed by
Chief Justice Marshall in Johnson, supra note 8 at 592.
23. Johnson, ibid at 584-86.
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Lindsay Robertson, in his illuminating study of the background and political
context of Johnson, has argued convincingly that Chief Justice Marshall went
beyond the parameters of the case as pleaded and argued in order to uphold land
grants by Virginia to Revolutionary War militiamen in western areas where the
Indian title had not yet been acquired by treaty.24 As Robertson has pointed out,
Chief Justice Marshall could have disposed of the case before him quite easily by
relying on the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Instead, he formulated the doctrine
of discovery as a means for asserting that France and Great Britain had title to
lands within the territories claimed by them in North America, and that the
States succeeded to the title of Britain after they declared their independence.
According to Robertson, Marshall thereby fulfilled his purpose, which was clearly
outside the scope of the case, of supporting the validity of the militia grants.
In addition, Robertson has shown how flimsy the authority really was for
the doctrine of discovery, as formulated by Chief Justice Marshall. Much of the
support for it was extracted from Marshall’s own much criticized work as a colonial
historian in volume one of his Life of George Washington, originally published in
1804.25 As Marshall did not have access to primary sources in writing the history
of the American colonies contained in this volume, he relied almost exclusively
on the work of a few prominent authors, whose own methodology was open to
question. Moreover, he ignored alternative histories, such as Thomas Jefferson’s
Notes on the State of Virginia,26 that would have provided different perspectives.27
Foremost among the authorities Marshall relied upon in volume one of
his Life of George Washington was George Chalmers, who published his Political
Annals of the Present United Colonies from their Settlement to the Peace of 1763
in 1780.28 Regarding European colonization of North America, Chalmers had
written: “It soon became a law among the European nations, that the counties
which each should explore shall be deemed the absolute property of the discoverer,
24. Robertson, Conquest by Law, supra note 14 at 77-112.
25. John Marshall, The Life of George Washington, Commander in Chief of the American Forces,
During the War Which Established the Independence of His Country, and First President of the
United States (Philadelphia: CP Wayne, 1804) vol 1. For a passage-by-passage comparison,
see Lindsay G Robertson, “John Marshall as Colonial Historian: Reconsidering the Origins
of the Doctrine of Discovery” (1997) 13:4 JL & Pol 759 [Robertson, “John Marshall as
Colonial Historian”].
26. (1784, reprinted Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1955) vol 1. Personal
animosity may have contributed to this omission, as it is well known that Marshall and
Jefferson were antagonists. See Jean Edward Smith, John Marshall: Definer of a Nation (New
York: Henry Holt & Company, 1996) at 11-14, 333-34.
27. Robertson, Conquest by Law, supra note 14 at 102-3.
28. (reprinted New York: Burt Franklin, 1968).
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from which all others shall be entirely excluded.”29 The major problem with this
assertion was that it is not apparent that such a rule was ever part of the European
law of nations. From the time Columbus first arrived in the Americas in 1492,
the European nations had relied on a variety of methods to assert their territorial
claims. These included discovery, papal grants, symbolic acts of possession,
colonial charters, and effective occupation by settlement. There was, however,
no agreement among Europeans over the effectiveness of these various acts, apart
perhaps from effective occupation. While Spain and Portugal favoured discovery
and papal grants because it was generally in their interests to do so, France and
Britain relied more on symbolic acts, colonial charters, and occupation.30
Moreover, Chalmers himself, in the paragraphs preceding the passage
just quoted, acknowledged these alternative methods and, while rejecting the
efficacy of papal grants, seems to have endorsed the position of Emer de Vattel,
probably the most influential international jurist of the time, on the acquisition
of territorial sovereignty by occupation.31 Vattel wrote that,
[When] a nation finds a country uninhabited, and without an owner, it may lawfully
take possession of it: and, after it has sufficiently made known its will in this respect,
it cannot be deprived of it by another nation. Thus, navigators going on voyages
of discovery, furnished with a commission from their sovereign, and meeting with
islands or other lands in a desert state, have taken possession of them in the name

29. Ibid at 6.
30. See e.g. L Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol 1 (London: Longmans, Green,
1905) at 265; MF Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in
International Law (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1926); Friedrich August Freiherr von
der Heydte, “Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in International
Law” (1935) 29:3 Am J Int’l L 448; Julius Goebel, Jr, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands:
A Study in Legal and Diplomatic History (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1971) at
47-119; John Thomas Juricek, “English Claims in North America to 1660: A Study in
Legal and Constitutional History” (PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago Department
of History, 1970) [unpublished]; Brian Slattery, French Claims in North America 1500-59
(Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1980); Brian Slattery, “Paper
Empires: The Legal Dimensions of French and English Ventures in North America” in John
McLaren, AR Buck & Nancy E Wright, eds, Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British
Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) 50; Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in
European Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995); Ali Friedberg, “Reconsidering the Doctrine of Discovery: Spanish Land Acquisition
in Mexico (1521-1821)” (1999) 17:1 Wis Int’l LJ 87. Compare Arthur S Keller, Oliver
J Lissitzyn & Frederick J Mann, Creation of Rights of Sovereignty through Symbolic Acts
1400-1800 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938).
31. Chalmers, supra note 28 at 5.
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of their nation: and this title has been usually respected, provided it was soon after
followed by a real possession.32

Elaborating on his important qualification that the discovery and formal
act of taking possession had to be “soon after followed by a real possession,”
Vattel questioned “whether a nation can, by the bare act of taking possession,
appropriate to itself countries which it does not really occupy, and thus engross
a much greater extent of territory than it is able to people or cultivate.”33 He
accordingly concluded:
The law of nations will, therefore, not acknowledge the property and sovereignty of
a nation over any uninhabited countries, except those of which it has really taken
actual possession, in which it has formed settlements, or of which it makes actual
use. In effect, when navigators have met with desert countries in which those of other
nations had, in their transient visits, erected some monument to shew their having
taken possession of them, they have paid as little regard to that empty ceremony, as
to the regulation of the popes, who divided a great part of the world between the
crowns of Castile and Portugal.34

Ignoring the fact that Vattel was referring to uninhabited countries of which
possession had actually been taken, Chalmers concluded that by virtue of voyages
of discovery and exploration of the east coast of North America by Sebastian
Cabot, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, and Sir Walter Raleigh, “the sovereigns of
England acquired, by the equity of first discovery and prior possession, a title, in
right of the crown, to a great part of the North-American continent.”35 Chalmers
concluded as well that the Indians of North America presented no barrier in
law to the acquisition of this title, as “[t]he roving of the erratic tribes over wide
extended deserts does not form a possession which excludes the subsequent
occupancy of emigrants from countries overstocked with inhabitants.”36 Here
too Chalmers relied on Vattel, who had opined that the principle that no nation
could appropriate for itself more territory than it could effectively occupy and
use meant that nations with scant populations could not have title to immense
regions used only for hunting, fishing, and gathering. But while Vattel concluded
from this that one does not “deviate from the views of nature in confining
the Indians within narrower limits,”37 his approach would not have permitted
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Vattel, supra note 5, § 207.
Ibid, § 208.
Ibid.
Chalmers, supra note 28 at 5.
Ibid.
Vattel, supra note 5, § 209.
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Europeans to acquire by occupation areas that were more intensively used by
the Indian nations for agriculture and other purposes.38 In this regard as well,
Chalmers went well beyond the authority of Vattel on which he relied.39
In a footnote, Chalmers also referred to William Blackstone’s Commentaries
on the Laws of England,40 without acknowledging that Blackstone had expressed
contrary views on the acquisition of European sovereignty in North America. In
a particularly scathing passage, Blackstone had written in reference to acquisition
of territory by occupation:
[S]o long as it was confined to flocking and cultivation of desart uninhabited
countries, it kept strictly within the limits of the law of nature. But how far the
seising on countries already peopled, and driving out or massacring the innocent
and defenceless natives, merely because they differed from their invaders in language,
in religion, in customs, in government, or in colour; how far such a conduct was
consonant to nature, to reason, or to christianity, deserved well to be considered by
those, who have rendered their names immortal by thus civilizing mankind.41

Consistent with this, Blackstone had concluded that Britain’s American
colonies had generally been acquired, not by occupation of legally vacant territory,
but by conquest and treaty.42
So Chalmers’ views on the law of nations in relation to acquisition of
North America by English discovery and exploration were not supported by
the authorities upon which he purported to rely. By depending on Chalmers in
his exposition of the doctrine of discovery in volume one of the Life of George
38. On Indian land use in New England, see William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians,
Colonists, and the Ecology of New England (New York: Hill & Wang, 1983). On the disregard
of Indian agriculture by Americans in the early years of the nineteenth century, see Stuart
Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 2005) at 150-60.
39. It is worth noting that in Johnson v M’Intosh, Chief Justice Marshall declined to “enter into
the controversy, whether agriculturalists, merchants, and manufacturers, have a right on
abstract principles, to expel hunters from the territory they possess, or to contract their
limits” (supra note 8 at 588). Instead, somewhat inconsistently with his formulation of
the doctrine of discovery, he concluded that “[c]onquest gives a title which the Courts of
the conqueror cannot deny” (ibid). However, he obviously had some difficulty with this
explanation, as later in his judgment he described “the pretension of converting the discovery
of an inhabited country into a conquest” as “extravagant” (ibid at 591).
40. Chalmers, supra note 28 at 9, n 16, citing William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765-69).
41. Ibid, vol 2 at 7 [sic]. Significantly, Blackstone was writing in the decade immediately after
the publication of Vattel’s celebrated work in 1758 and less than 15 years before Chalmers’
book was published.
42. Ibid, vol 1 at 108-09.
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Washington, Chief Justice Marshall committed the same errors. These errors were
then transposed into his judgment in Johnson. But in fact his assertion in that
case that all the colonizing European nations agreed that territorial sovereignty in
North America could be acquired by discovery was simply not true.43 Moreover,
Chief Justice Marshall should have known better, as he was familiar with the
well-known and influential works of Vattel and Blackstone.44
Lindsay Robertson has pointed out that Chief Justice Marshall changed his
views on the doctrine of discovery in Worcester v Georgia,45 after he saw how
Johnson was being used to subject the Indians to State laws and force their removal
west of the Mississippi.46 In Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged the
independence of the Indian nations and questioned the value of discovery as a
means of acquiring territorial sovereignty in North America:
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people,
divided into separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest of the world,
having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their own laws. It is
difficult to comprehend the proposition that the inhabitants of either quarter of the
globe could have rightful original claims over the inhabitants of the other, or over
the lands they occupied; or that the discovery of either by the other should give the
discoverer rights in the country discovered which annulled the pre-existing rights of
its ancient possessors.47

Chief Justice Marshall was not, however, prepared to discard entirely
the doctrine of discovery he had formulated nine years earlier in Johnson.
Instead, he modified it by stating that it only governed relations among the
colonizing European powers—it did not affect the prior rights of the Indian
nations. He wrote that,
43. See supra note 30.
44. Marshall’s legal education included the study of Blackstone. See Smith, supra note 26 at
75-78. Vattel was cited in relation to the rights of the Indian nations in argument in Fletcher,
supra note 22; Blackstone was referred to by Chief Justice Marshall in his judgment in that
case at 138, 144. Chief Justice Marshall is said to have cited Vattel more often than any
other author on the law of nations. See James G Apple, “Emmerich de Vattel (Switzerland),
1714-1767” (2013), online: International Judicial Monitor <http://www.judicialmonitor.org/
archive_spring2013/leadingfigures.html>.
45. 31 US (6 Pet) 515, 8 L Ed 483 (1832) [Worcester cited to Pet]. See also Kent McNeil,
“Sovereignty on the Northern Plains: Indian, European, American and Canadian Claims”
(2000) 39:3 J West 10 at 11-14; Mark D Walters, “The Morality of Aboriginal Law” (2006)
31:2 Queen’s LJ 470 at 503-09; Ulla Secher, Aboriginal Customary Law: A Source of Common
Law Title to Land (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014) at 51-58.
46. Robertson, Conquest by Law, supra note 14 at 118-35.
47. Worcester, supra note 45 at 542-43.
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[Discovery] was an exclusive principle which shut out the right of competition
among those who had agreed to it; not one which could annul the previous rights of
those who had not agreed to it. It regulated the right given by discovery among the
European discoverers, but could not affect the rights of those already in possession,
either as aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a discovery made before
the memory of man.48

But by then, Robertson contends, it was too late: The doctrine of discovery
and the consequential acquisition of title to Indian lands by the discovering
sovereign (subject to a continuing Indian right of occupancy), as propounded by
Chief Justice Marshall in Johnson, was already fueling Indian removal, and this
process could not be stopped by a revision of the law. Moreover, appointees to the
US Supreme Court by President Andrew Jackson, a key proponent of removal,
supported the policy and its juristic underpinnings in subsequent decisions,
effectively nullifying Chief Justice Marshall’s revision of the doctrine in Worcester.49
There can be no doubt that Chief Justice Marshall’s doctrine of discovery, as
initially formulated in Johnson, was seriously flawed. We have already seen that it
was not supported by the authorities cited by Chalmers, who was subsequently
relied upon by the Chief Justice. Moreover, it was inconsistent for Chief Justice
Marshall to conclude, as he did in his judgment in that case, that the Indian
nations’ “rights to complete sovereignty” had been diminished by European
discovery,50 because if the Indian nations had been sovereign then their territories
could only have been acquired derivatively by conquest or cession.51 The
self-serving, imperialist foundations, as well as the racist assumptions, underlying
the doctrine of discovery are also glaringly apparent, as made abundantly clear

48. Ibid at 544.
49. Robertson, Conquest by Law, supra note 14 at 135-42; Pommersheim, supra note 9 at 100;
Watson, “Doctrine of Discovery,” supra note 21 at 1006-07. See e.g. Martin v Waddell’s Lessee,
41 US (16 Pet) 367 at 409, 10 L Ed 597 (1842). Chief Justice Taney wrote:
The English possessions in America were not claimed by right of conquest, but by right of
discovery. For, according to the principles of international law, as understood by the then
civilized powers of Europe, the Indian tribes in the new world were regarded as mere temporary
occupants of the soil, and the absolute rights of property and dominion were held to belong
to the European nation by which any particular portion of the country was first discovered.

50. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
51. The International Court of Justice reached this conclusion in its advisory opinion in relation
to northwest Africa. See Western Sahara, supra note 6. On the distinction between original
and derivative territorial acquisition, see O’Connell, supra note 6; Crawford, supra note 6;
Tarring, supra note 6; Roberts-Wray, supra note 6.
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in Discovering Indigenous Lands.52 Furthermore, as Chief Justice Marshall realized
when he wrote his judgment in Worcester, any agreement among the European
powers on the rules for acquisition of territorial sovereignty overseas would have
been binding only among themselves, not on the Indian nations who were not
parties thereto.53
As we have seen, Lindsay Robertson has argued convincingly that Chief Justice
Marshall’s formulation of the doctrine of discovery in Johnson was influenced
by his desire to uphold the legal validity of Virginia’s grants to Revolutionary
War veterans. But did it serve other purposes that may or may not have been
in Marshall’s mind? At stake at the relevant times were not only land titles of
grantees of the States, but also the territorial ambitions of the United States further
west that came to be expressed by the concept of manifest destiny.54 In 1803,
President Thomas Jefferson had purchased the Louisiana Territory from France,
supposedly doubling the size of the United States.55 That was the year before
Chief Justice Marshall published volume one of his Life of George Washington.
In 1819, the uncertain western boundary of that territory was settled with Spain
by the Adams-Onís Treaty.56 In the four years between the signing of that treaty
and the US Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson, the Oregon boundary dispute
with Britain had heated up to the point where Congress was openly debating
unilateral occupation.57 To what extent were these territorial claims supported by
Marshall’s doctrine of discovery?
52. See Robert A Williams, Jr, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of
Conquest (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) at 308-17. See also supra note 9.
53. In international law, as well as in domestic contract law, agreements are generally binding
only on the parties thereto. See Direct United States Cable Company v Anglo-American
Telegraph Company (1887) 2 AC 394 at 421; Clipperton Island Case (1932), 26 Am J Int’l L
390 at 394; Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) at 309-21;
Charles G Fenwick, International Law, 4th ed (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965)
at 412; Crawford, supra note 6 at 384-85; Malcolm N Shaw, International Law, 7th ed
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 672-74.
54. See DW Meinig, The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History,
vol 2 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny:
American Expansion and the Empire of Right (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996).
55. See Jon Kukla, A Wilderness So Immense: The Louisiana Purchase and the Destiny of America
(New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2003).
56. See Thomas Maitland Marshall, A History of the Western Boundary of the Louisiana Purchase,
1819-1841 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1914); Philip Coolidge Brooks,
Diplomacy and the Borderlands: The Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1939).
57. Donald A Rakestraw, For Honour or Destiny: The Anglo-American Crisis Over the Oregon
Territory (New York: Peter Lang, 1995) at 17-19.
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As Robert Miller demonstrates in chapter three of Discovering Indigenous
Lands, the doctrine of discovery provided them with significant support.58 In so
far as the Louisiana territory was concerned, Jefferson thought French discovery
and formal possession, followed by the establishment of a few settlements on the
Gulf Coast and along the Mississippi, provided the foundation for the United
States’ claim to the entire western drainage basin of the Mississippi River, up
to the continental divide in the Rocky Mountains as far north as present-day
Montana.59 Jefferson then sent Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, and
their Corps of Discovery, to explore the Missouri River to its source and find
a practicable route from there to the Pacific for the purposes of commerce.60
This expedition to the West Coast, combined with the earlier discovery of the
mouth of the Columbia River by the American Captain Robert Gray in 1792,
was relied upon by the United States in diplomatic exchanges with Great Britain
as establishing American title to the Oregon country by priority of discovery.61
In formulating his doctrine of discovery in volume one of the Life of George
Washington and Johnson, did Chief Justice Marshall have the Louisiana Purchase

58. Supra note 1. See also Robert J Miller, Native America, Discovered and Conquered:
Thomas Jefferson, Lewis & Clark, and Manifest Destiny (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2006);
Pommersheim, supra note 9 at 96.
59. See Thomas Jefferson, “The Limits and Bounds of Louisiana” in Saul K Padover, ed, The
Complete Jefferson, Containing His Major Writings, Published and Unpublished, Except His
Letters (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1943) 259. Significantly, Jefferson’s views on
the territorial extent of the Louisiana Purchase have been generally accepted by geographers
and historians. See e.g. Meinig, supra note 54 at 12; Robert H Ferrell, “Louisiana Purchase”
in Howard R Lamar, ed, The New Encyclopedia of the American West (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1998) xxx at 657. Even Howard Zinn, whom one would expect to view the
matter more critically, wrote that “Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase had doubled the territory
of the United States, extending it to the Rocky Mountains.” See Howard Zinn, A People’s
History of the United States, 1492-Present, rev ed (New York: Harper Collins, 1999) at 149.
These views were not, however, supported by the international law of the time. See McNeil,
“Factual and Legal Sovereignty,” supra note 4 at 44-47.
60. “Instructions to Captain Lewis” in Merrill D Peterson, ed, The Portable Thomas Jefferson
(New York: Penguin Books, 1975) 308.
61. See Travers Twiss, The Oregon Territory; Its History and Discovery (New York: D Appelton &
Co, 1846); Frederick Merk, History of the Western Movement (New York: Alfred A Knopf,
1978) at 310; Rakestraw, supra note 57 at 5-26.
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and the Oregon boundary dispute in mind?62 Did he intend to further American
territorial ambitions west of the Mississippi? As he obviously would have been
aware of these matters at the time he was writing,63 it is difficult to believe the
Chief Justice would not have seen the connection between them and the doctrine
of discovery he articulated and applied. However, in the absence of any direct
evidence that his decision in Johnson in particular was influenced by the territorial
claims of the United States, no conclusive answers to these questions are available.64
62. In Johnson, Chief Justice Marshall referred to the “magnificent purchase of Louisiana,”
observing that it “was the purchase from France of a country almost entirely occupied by
numerous tribes of Indians, who are in fact independent. Yet, any attempt of others to
intrude into that country, would be considered an aggression which would justify war.” See
supra note 8 at 587. See also American Insurance Company v Canter, 26 US (1 Pet) 511 at
542, 7 L Ed 242 (1928). Here Chief Justice Marshall held that the “Constitution confers
absolutely on the government of the Union the powers of making war and of making
treaties; consequently that government possesses the power of acquiring territory either
by conquest or by treaty.” While that decision related to the acquisition of Florida from
Spain by the 1819 Adams-Onís Treaty (see supra note 56 and accompanying text), the same
reasoning would have applied to the Louisiana Purchase. See Sere v Pitot, 10 US (6 Cranch)
332, 3 L Ed 240 (1810) (addressing Congressional authority over the Territory of Orleans
within the area of the Louisiana Purchase). See also Foster v Neilson, 27 US (2 Pet) 253 at
300, 8 S Ct (1829) (addressing the location of the boundary between French Louisiana
and Spanish Florida immediately prior to the cession of Louisiana to the United States in
1803). Here Chief Justice Marshall observed: “Without tracing the title of France to its
origin, we may state with confidence that, at the commencement of the [Seven Years’] War
of 1756, she was the undisputed possessor of the province of Louisiana, lying on both sides
the Mississippi and extending eastward beyond the Bay of Mobile.” However, he went on
to decide that the boundary issue was a political matter on which the Court had to defer to
the US government.
63. Chief Justice Marshall rendered his judgment in Johnson on 10 March 1823. From December
1822 to February 1823, Congress had spent several days debating a bill for occupation of the
Oregon country, introduced by Dr. John Floyd in the House of Representatives. See United
States, The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, Seventeenth Congress,
Second Session (Washington, DC: Gales & Seaton, 1855).
64. My search of the US Supreme Court and Library of Congress holdings relating to Johnson
did not turn up anything that would shed light on these questions. Nor have I found The
Papers of John Marshall, 12 vols, to be of assistance in this regard. See Herbert A Johnson &
Charles F Hobson, eds, The Papers of John Marshall (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North
Carolina Press, 1974-2006). However, we know that Chief Justice Marshall was revising the
first volume of his Life of George Washington, supra note 25, published separately in 1824 as a
History of the American Colonies, at the same time Johnson was before the Court, and that his
judgment in that case was heavily influenced by what he had written on the subject in that
volume twenty years earlier. See Letter from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (3 May
1823) in Hobson, ibid, vol 9, 303. See also Editorial Note on Johnson v M’Intosh, ibid, 279 at
281; Robertson, “John Marshall as Colonial Historian,” supra note 25.
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But regardless of whether he was so influenced or not, I agree with Robert Miller
that reassessment and rejection of the doctrine of discovery are well overdue.65 It
is shameful that American courts still rely on a historically inaccurate, doctrinally
flawed, and blatantly racist doctrine to explain the acquisition of European, and
hence American, sovereignty in North America.

II. RECONSIDERING THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
OF DISCOVERY IN CANADA
In chapters four and five of Discovering Indigenous Lands, Tracey Lindberg has
critically assessed the early development of the doctrine of discovery during the
colonization of Canada, the adoption and application of the doctrine by the SCC,
and the continuing reliance on the doctrine by the government of Canada.66 I
think the Court is becoming increasingly uncomfortable with the doctrine and
agree with Felix Hoehn that a judicial reassessment of its application in Canada
is already underway.
The application of the doctrine of discovery in Canada is complicated by
the fact that, as in the United States, parts of the country were colonized by the
French before being acquired by Britain. The standard explanation for acquisition
of Crown sovereignty in the parts first colonized by France is that Britain
acquired them derivatively from France by conquest and cession, first of Acadia
in 1713 and then of La Nouvelle France in 1759–1763.67 The rest of Canada is
presumed to have been acquired by settlement,68 which is the British imperial
law equivalent of effective occupation in international law. The foundation for
French sovereignty, whether priority of discovery, symbolic taking of possession,
effective occupation, or some other means, usually remains unanalyzed in the case
law.69 However, Justice Taschereau, in his concurring judgment in St Catharines
65. See Deloria, supra note 9; Wilkins & Lomawaima, supra note 9; Pommersheim, supra note
9; Robertson, “John Marshall as Colonial Historian,” supra note 25; Watson, “Impact of the
Doctrine of Discovery,” supra note 9; Watson, “Doctrine of Discovery,” supra note 21.
66. See also Watson, “Impact of the Doctrine of Discovery,” supra note 9 at 529-38.
67. See R v Marshall; R v Bernard, 2005 SCC 43, [2005] 2 SCR 220 at para 71 [Marshall;
Bernard]; Sioui v Quebec (Attorney General), [1990] 1 SCR 1025 at 1051-52, 70 DLR
(4th) 427 [Sioui].
68. However, as the extent of French Canada has never been authoritatively determined, the
boundaries between the conquered and ceded parts of Canada and the settled parts remain
uncertain. See e.g. Kent McNeil, Native Rights and the Boundaries of Rupert’s Land and the
North-Western Territory (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1982).
69. See e.g. R v Adams, [1996] 3 SCR 101 at paras 31-33, 138 DLR (4th) 657; R v Côtê, [1996]
3 SCR 139 at paras 42-54, 138 DLR (4th) 385; Marshall; Bernard, supra note 67 at para 71.
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Milling and Lumber Company v The Queen,70 did rely expressly on discovery as
the basis for French sovereignty in La Nouvelle France, and Justice Patterson in
R v Syliboy explained French sovereignty in Acadia in the same way,71 but the
issue was not addressed by the Privy Council on appeal of the former case,72
and Justice Patterson’s judgment was discredited by the Court in R v Simon.73
In his unanimous decision in Sioui,74 Justice Lamer (as he then was) referred to
“France’s de facto control in Canada” prior to the British victory on the Plains of
Abraham in 1759 and the capitulation of Montreal in 1760, but also concluded
on the basis of “the historical documents that both Great Britain and France felt
that the Indian nations had sufficient independence and played a large enough
role in North America for it to be good policy to maintain relations with them
very close to those maintained between sovereign nations.”75 This hardly seems
consistent with European acquisition of sovereignty by discovery.
And yet in R v Sparrow,76 decided just one week after Sioui, Chief Justice
Dickson and Justice La Forest, delivering the unanimous judgment of the Court,
simply assumed that Crown sovereignty had been acquired in British Columbia
“from the outset,” without specifying how that had occurred: “It is worth
70. (1887), 13 SCR 577 at 643-44, 13 OAR 148.
71. [1929] 1 DLR 307 at 313 (Co Ct), 4 CNLC 430. Justice Patterson stated:
A civilized nation first discovering a country of uncivilized people or savages held such country
as its own until such time as by treaty it was transferred to some other civilized nation. The
savages’ rights of sovereignty even of ownership were never recognized. Nova Scotia had passed
to Great Britain not by gift or purchase from or even by conquest of the Indians but by treaty
with France, which had acquired it by priority of discovery and ancient possession; and the
Indians passed with it.

72. St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v The Queen [1888] UKPC 70, 14 App Cas 46.
Note that the spelling of the company’s name is not consistent in the reports.
73. [1985] 2 SCR 387 at 399, 24 DLR (4th) 390. Chief Justice Dickson observed that “the
language used by Patterson J, illustrated in this passage, reflects the biases and prejudices of
another era in our history. Such language is no longer acceptable in Canadian law and indeed
is inconsistent with a growing sensitivity to native rights in Canada.”
74. Sioui, supra note 67 at 1052-1053.
75. Ibid at 1052-53 [emphasis in original]. Justice Lamer continued:

The mother countries did everything in their power to secure the alliance of each Indian
nation and to encourage nations allied with the enemy to change sides. When these efforts met
with success, they were incorporated in treaties of alliance or neutrality. This clearly indicates
that the Indian nations were regarded in their relations with the European nations which
occupied North America as independent nations. The papers of Sir William Johnson (The
Papers of Sir William Johnson, 14 vol.), who was in charge of Indian affairs in British North
America, demonstrate the recognition by Great Britain that nation-to-nation relations had to
be conducted with the North American Indians (at 1053).

76. [1990] 1 SCR 1075, 70 DLR (4th) 385 [Sparrow cited to SCR].
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recalling that while British policy toward the native population was based on
respect for their right to occupy their traditional lands, a proposition to which
the Royal Proclamation of 1763 bears witness, there was from the outset never
any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the underlying title,
to such lands vested in the Crown.”77 The main authority they gave to support
that assumption was Johnson,78 which as we have seen is the American case where
Chief Justice Marshall first put the judicial stamp of approval on the discovery
doctrine.79 The Court therefore seems to have accepted discovery as the basis for
Crown sovereignty in British Columbia.80 Yet the contrast between Sioui and
Sparrow could not be starker in this regard, even though they must have been
written at virtually the same time, albeit by different Supreme Court justices.
The major distinction appears to be the very different histories in eastern Canada
and British Columbia: In the former, as Justice Lamer recounted, the French
and British both treated the Indigenous peoples as independent nations up to
1760 because they needed them as allies, whereas on the West Coast where
colonization took place later the British Crown simply asserted sovereignty.
Governor Douglas entered into fourteen treaties with Coast Salish and Kwakiutl
peoples on Vancouver Island in the 1850s, but these agreements were for the
acquisition of lands and did not acknowledge the pre-existing sovereignty of the
Indigenous parties.
The issue of Crown sovereignty came up more directly in Delgamuukw v
British Columbia,81 in which the Court decided that Aboriginal title depends on
proof of exclusive occupation of land by Indigenous peoples at the time of Crown
assertion of sovereignty. Chief Justice Lamer, writing the principal judgment,
accepted the trial judge’s decision, not disputed on appeal, that the date of Crown
sovereignty in British Columbia was the Oregon Boundary Treaty of 1846,82
whereby the United States and Britain agreed that the 49th parallel would be the
boundary between their respective territories in the Pacific Northwest from the
77. Ibid at 1103. For critical commentary, see Michael Asch and Patrick Macklem, “Aboriginal
Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essay on R. v. Sparrow” (1991) 29:2 Alta L Rev 498.
78. See also Guerin v The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335 at 377-78, 13 DLR (4th) 321 (Justice
Dickson, as he then was, citing Johnson and apparently accepting the doctrine of discovery).
79. Chief Justice Dickson and Justice La Forest also cited Calder v Attorney General of British
Columbia, [1973] SCR 313, 34 DLR (3d) 145 [Calder cited to SCR]. See ibid at 328,
Judson J; ibid at 383, 402, Hall J.
80. See also ibid at 320-21, Judson J; ibid at 380-85, Hall J.
81. [1997] 3 SCR 1010, 153 DLR (4th) 193 [Delgamuukw cited to SCR].
82. See Bruce Hutchison, The Struggle for the Border (Don Mills, ON: Longman Canada, 1970)
at 288-98; Norman L Nicholson, The Boundaries of the Canadian Confederation (Toronto:
Macmillan, 1979) at 45-47.

718

(2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

Rocky Mountains to the Strait of Georgia.83 This may be a partial retreat from
reliance on the discovery doctrine, as English/British discovery occurred much
earlier, possibly in 1579 by Sir Francis Drake during his circumnavigation of the
globe, and certainly no later than the voyages of Captains Cook and Vancouver in
the latter part of the 18th century.84 Nonetheless, by relying on an international
treaty to which Indigenous peoples were not party, the Court implicitly denied
their pre-existing sovereignty, and indicated that the British Crown could
acquire sovereignty by simply asserting it and having it acknowledged by another
member of the international community from which Indigenous peoples were
excluded at the time.85
As Felix Hoehn has argued persuasively in his book,86 the first serious
judicial reconsideration of the basis for Crown sovereignty in British Columbia
was undertaken by Chief Justice McLachlin in her unanimous judgments in
Haida Nation v British Columbia87 and Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British
Columbia,88 delivered the same day in 2004. As those cases involved the Crown’s
duty to consult where Aboriginal title is claimed but has not yet been established,
the issue of sovereignty was not as directly relevant as in Delgamuukw. The Chief
Justice nonetheless took the opportunity to make significant statements that
reveal a definite shift in the Court’s understanding of the matter. For the first
time, the Court referred to “pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty,” and said that
the promise of rights recognition in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 198289
“is realized and sovereignty claims reconciled through the process of honourable
83. Delgamuukw, supra note 81 at para 145. See also Calder, supra note 79 at 325-26, Judson
J; Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 SCR 257 [Tsilhqot’in
Nation]. For critical commentary, see John Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis
of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall LJ 537; Kent McNeil,
“Negotiated Sovereignty: Indian Treaties and the Acquisition of American and Canadian
Territorial Rights in the Pacific Northwest” in Alexandra Harmon, ed, The Power of Promises:
Rethinking Indian Treaties in the Pacific Northwest (Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 2008) 35.
84. For consideration of alternative dates prior to 1846, see Justice Vickers’ trial judgment
in Tsihqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700, [2008] 1 CNLR 112 at paras
585-602. He rejected discovery as a means for Crown acquisition of sovereignty, but
nonetheless accepted 1846 as the appropriate year.
85. On the transition from inclusion of Indigenous peoples in the early law of nations to their
exclusion in positivist 19th century international law, see Morin, supra note 5.
86. Reconciling Sovereignties, supra note 2 at 33-36. My own analysis of this aspect of Haida
Nation and Taku River relies heavily on Hoehn’s much more detailed discussion.
87. Supra note 10.
88. Supra note 11.
89. Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
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negotiation.”90 “Treaties,” Chief Justice McLachlin said, “serve to reconcile
pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed Crown sovereignty.”91 Prior to
this, the reconciliation that the Court has said is at the heart of section 35 was
between prior Aboriginal occupation and Crown sovereignty.92 In other words,
the prior factual presence of Aboriginal peoples had to be reconciled with the
apparently legal sovereignty of the Crown. In Haida Nation and Taku River,
the prior occupation and sovereignty of the Aboriginal peoples—which must
have been legal under their systems of law—has to be reconciled with “de facto
Crown sovereignty.”93 It therefore appears that the sovereignty of the Crown,
while undeniable as a matter of fact, in some sense lacks legality until provided
with legitimacy through negotiated treaties.94 This is a far cry from the discovery
doctrine. Instead of being acquired by discovery, sovereignty was obtained by “the
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over an Aboriginal people and de facto control of
lands and resources that were formerly in control of that people.”95
But was Crown sovereignty acquired by assertion, de facto control, or a
combination of the two? If by mere assertion, it would not have been de facto
until the Crown actually exercised jurisdiction and control on the ground.96 We
know as a historical matter that this did not happen all at once, and certainly
had not occurred in most of British Columbia—including the territories of the
Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en that were at issue in the Delgamuukw case—by 1846.
And yet that was the year accepted by the SCC as the time of Crown assertion
of sovereignty over their territories, and applied by the Court more recently to
the territory of the Tsilhqot’in people in its 2014 decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation.97
It is therefore difficult to avoid the conclusion that to some extent the Court
is still clinging to the notion that the Crown could acquire de jure sovereignty
over Indigenous peoples and their territories by mere assertion, which, like the
discovery doctrine, seems to involve denial of the pre-existing sovereignty of the
Indigenous peoples. There thus appears to be unresolved tension between the
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Haida Nation, supra note 10 at para 20.
Ibid.
See e.g. R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507 at paras 31, 43, 137 DLR (4th) 289.
Taku River, supra note 11 at para 42. See also Haida Nation, supra note 10 at para 32.
See also Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown” (2005) 29 SCLR
(2d) 433 at 436-38; Walters, supra note 45 at 513-17; Gordon Christie, “Aboriginal Title and
Private Property” in Maria Morellato, ed, Aboriginal Law Since Delgamuukw (Aurora, ON:
Canada Law Book, 2009) 177.
95. Haida Nation, supra note 10 at para 32.
96. See McNeil, “Factual and Legal Sovereignty,” supra note 4 at 37.
97. Supra note 83.
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Court’s acknowledgment of that pre-existing sovereignty in Haida Nation and
the Court’s continuing reliance on assertion as a means by which the Crown
acquired sovereignty. Nor is this tension resolved by trying to distinguish between
assertion and acquisition of sovereignty. While the Court has tended to use the
term “assertion” in this context, in Delgamuukw Chief Justice Lamer decided
that Aboriginal occupation has to be proven at the time of assertion of Crown
sovereignty because this is when Aboriginal title crystallized:
Aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown’s underlying title. However, the Crown
did not gain this title until it asserted sovereignty over the land in question. Because
it does not make sense to speak of a burden on the underlying title before that title
existed, aboriginal title crystallized at the time sovereignty was asserted.98

Although the Court has not been particularly forthright in explaining
how the Crown got its underlying title, it seems to be based on the common
law doctrine of tenure, by which the Crown is presumed to have the radical
or underlying title to all lands within its dominions.99 As the common law
would not have applied in British Columbia before the Crown acquired de jure
sovereignty, Chief Justice Lamer’s judgment in Delgamuukw must be understood
as equating Crown assertion of sovereignty with de jure sovereignty, which does
not appear to require actual exercise of jurisdiction, as most of British Columbia
was not occupied or controlled by the Crown at the relevant time in 1846. In
Tsilhqot’in Nation, Chief Justice McLachlin followed this aspect of Chief Justice
Lamer’s decision, despite her earlier acknowledgement of pre-existing Indigenous
sovereignty in Haida Nation.100

98. Delgamuukw, supra note 81 at para 145.
99. See Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) at 79-84,
241-43 [McNeil, Common Law]; Highland, supra note 21. The High Court of Australia has
been more explicit in applying the doctrine of tenure in this context. See especially Mabo
v Queensland [No 2], [1992] HCA 23, (1992) 175 CLR 1 at 25-31, 46-48 [Mabo]. For
insightful criticism and an alternate approach, see Secher, supra note 45 at 147-96, 286-335.
100. Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 83. Chief Justice McLachlin observed that:
At the time of assertion of European sovereignty, the Crown acquired radical or underlying
title to all the land in the province. This Crown title, however, was burdened by the pre-existing
legal rights of Aboriginal people who occupied and used the land prior to European arrival.
The doctrine of terra nullius (that no one owned the land prior to European assertion of
sovereignty) never applied in Canada, as confirmed by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The
Aboriginal interest in land that burdens the Crown’s underlying title is an independent legal
interest, which gives rise to a fiduciary duty on the part of the Crown (at para 69).
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III. TOWARDS RESOLUTION AND RECONCILIATION
Our examination of Chief Justice Marshall’s judgment in Johnson revealed the
same kind of contradiction that has now surfaced in the judgments of Chief
Justice McLachlin in Haida Nation and Tsilhqot’in Nation: The pre-existing
sovereignty of the Indigenous nations is acknowledged, and yet the Crown
in some sense was able to acquire sovereignty over them and their territories
unilaterally by discovery or assertion. The contradiction lies in the fact that, given
the Indigenous nations’ pre-existing sovereignty, the Crown should only have
been able to acquire sovereignty derivatively by conquest or cession, neither of
which occurred in British Columbia.101 And yet we also know as a matter of
fact that the United States acknowledged the Crown’s sovereignty there by the
Oregon Boundary Treaty of 1846, that the Crown gradually acquired de facto
sovereignty through the unilateral exercise of control and jurisdiction, and that
the international community has since accepted the Crown’s sovereignty over
British Columbia as part of Canada.102
Chief Justice Marshall attempted to resolve this contradiction in Worcester by
limiting the application of the doctrine of discovery to the colonizing European
nations. As we have seen, he realized that a doctrine of the law of nations that had
been created by agreement among the European powers could not apply to the
Indigenous nations of North America who were not parties to that agreement.103
On this revised formulation, the doctrine regulated the territorial rights of the
European powers among themselves, but did not affect the pre-existing rights
of the Indigenous nations, including their sovereignty that was acknowledged
by the Chief Justice in Johnson and affirmed in Worcester. For the European
powers to acquire sovereignty vis-à-vis the Indigenous nations, something more
was required: treaties, conquest, or the equivalent of conquest by imposition

101. See Haida Nation, supra note 10. Chief Justice McLachlin stated that “Canada’s Aboriginal
peoples were here when Europeans came, and were never conquered. Many bands reconciled
their claims with the sovereignty of the Crown through negotiated treaties. Others, notably
in British Columbia, have yet to do so” (at para 25).
102. Canada’s membership in the United Nations and its adherence to numerous international
conventions are evidence of this. There are, however, unresolved issues regarding the extent of
Canada’s claims in the Arctic.
103. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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of jurisdiction without necessarily engaging in armed conflict.104 Conquest
and imposition of jurisdiction could not occur without the actual exercise of
authority and control on the ground. It is this actual exercise of authority that
Chief Justice McLachlin must have had in mind in Haida Nation and Taku River
when she referred to the Crown’s de facto control and de facto sovereignty in
non-treaty areas of British Columbia. But de facto sovereignty could not have
been achieved by mere assertion or by a bilateral treaty between the United States
and the British Crown in 1846. If Crown sovereignty was acquired by either of
those means, it could not have been de facto at the time in most of the province
where the Crown was not in effective control, and so must have been de jure.105
Unlike de facto sovereignty, de jure sovereignty has to be assessed in the
context of a specific system of law. If two or more legal systems are potentially
applicable, it is possible for a claim to sovereignty to be legally valid in one system
and invalid in another. A modern example is provided by Rhodesia during the
white-minority regime of Ian Smith from the time of the Unilateral Declaration
of Independence (UDI) in 1965 to the downfall of his government in 1980.106
During this period the Smith regime, though racist and undemocratic, exercised

104. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v United States, 348 US 272 at 279, 75 S Ct 313 (1955). Justice
Reed writes that “[t]he position of the Indian has long been rationalized by the legal theory
that discovery and conquest gave the conquerors sovereignty over and ownership of the
lands thus obtained” [emphasis added]. He also acknowledged the pre-existing sovereignty
of the Indigenous nations in observing that “[a]fter conquest, they [the Indian tribes]
were permitted to occupy portions of territory over which they had previously exercised
‘sovereignty’, as we use that term” (ibid).
105. For an example from another part of Canada, see R v Powley, 2003 SCC 43, [2003] 2 SRC
207 [Powley]. The Court held that effective European control of the Sault Ste Marie area of
what is now Ontario was not obtained “until just prior to 1850” (ibid at para 40). The Court
said this is “the time when Europeans effectively established political and legal control in
a particular area” (ibid at para 37). As effective European control must be equivalent to de
facto sovereignty, this means that assertions of sovereignty by the French as early as 1671 and
the Crown’s claims to sovereignty as a result of cession of La Nouvelle France to Britain in
1763 would have been de jure but not de facto. On France’s formal assertion of sovereignty
at Sault Ste Marie in 1671, see Francis Borgia Steck, The Jolliet-Marquette Expedition,
1673 (Glendale, CA: Arthur H Clark Company, 1928) at 125-30; John Anthony Caruso,
The Mississippi Valley Frontier: The Age of French Exploration and Settlement (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966) at 151-53. See also Sioui, supra note 67 at 1052. Regarding
Crown sovereignty, Justice Lamer (as he then was) stated that “Great Britain’s de jure control
of Canada took the form of the Treaty of Paris of February 10, 1763.”
106. For other examples and more detailed discussion, see McNeil, “Factual and Legal
Sovereignty,” supra note 4 at 41-44.
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the effective control required for de facto sovereignty.107 But because Smith’s
government was illegal by international standards, Rhodesia’s independence was
generally not acknowledged by the international community. Consequently, in
international law Rhodesia was not acknowledged to be a sovereign state and
de jure sovereignty was denied.108 Similarly, in English law Rhodesia was not
accorded de jure sovereignty because Rhodesian independence was rejected by the
British government109 and English courts declared UDI to be illegal.110 However,
after some hesitation, courts within Rhodesia did recognize the Constitution of
1965 and thus the legality of the Smith government, thereby acknowledging the
de jure sovereignty of Rhodesia.111 De jure sovereignty can therefore depend on
a choice of law—in this instance, Rhodesia was a sovereign state in Rhodesian
domestic law but not in international or English law. The Rhodesian example
also illustrates that de facto sovereignty does not necessarily result in de jure
sovereignty in a particular legal system.
So when Chief Justice Marshall decided in Worcester that the doctrine of
discovery only applies among the European nations, he was acknowledging that
a claim to sovereignty can be valid in one legal system and apply to the polities
(the European nation states) that have legal personality in that system, without
being valid in other legal systems vis-à-vis polities (the Indigenous nations in
North America) that have legal personality in those legal systems.112 This insight
can be used to help understand the relationship between Indigenous and Crown
sovereignty in Canada. The analysis needs to start by distinguishing between
107. See DJ Devine, “The Status of Rhodesia in International Law” (1973) Acta Juridica 1
at 78-89; Isaak I Dore, “Recognition of Rhodesia and Traditional International Law:
Some Conceptual Problems” (1980) 13:1 Vand J Transnat’l L 25 at 33-38; John Dugard,
Recognition and the United Nations (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1987) at 91.
108. See Dore, supra note 107; Dugard, supra note 107 at 90-98. Compare Devine, supra note
107 at 70-78 (opining that the Rhodesian UDI and the situation resulting from it were
“extra-legal,” not “illegal”).
109. See e.g. Southern Rhodesia Constitution Order 1965, SI 1965, No 1952.
110. See Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke, (1968), [1969] 1 AC 645, [1968] 3 All ER 561 (PC);
Adams v Adams (1970), [1971] P 188, [1970] 3 All ER 572 [Adams cited to All ER].
111. See Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke, NO [1968] 2 S Afr LR 284 & 457, (RAD); Dhlamini
and Others v Carter, NO [1968] 2 S Afr LR 445 & 464, (RAD); Dhlamini and Another v
Carter, NO [1968] 2 S Afr LR 467, (RAD); R v Ndhlovu [1968] 4 S Afr LR 515, (RSA).
For commentary, see Dugard, supra note 107 at 90; Claire Palley, “The Judicial Process:
U.D.I. and the Southern Rhodesia Judiciary” (1967) 30:3 Mod L Rev 263; SA de Smith,
“Constitutional Lawyers in Revolutionary Situations” (1968) 7 West Ont L Rev 93; FM
Brookfield, “The Courts, Kelsen, and the Rhodesian Revolution” (1969) 19:3 UTLJ 326.
112. Chief Justice Marshall CJ acknowledged the existence of the legal and political systems of the
Indigenous peoples. See Johnson, supra note 8 at 593-94; Worcester, supra note 45 at 559-61.
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de facto and de jure sovereignty.113 De facto sovereignty is self-evidently an
empirical matter that has to be established by evidence of effective “political and
legal control in a particular area.”114 De jure sovereignty is sovereignty that is
acknowledged as such by a particular legal system. Unlike de facto sovereignty,
de jure sovereignty is relative: It applies only in the context of a particular legal
system in relation to the polities that have legal personality within that system.115
I think it should be obvious that, prior to European colonization, the Indigenous
peoples of North America had de facto sovereignty, as well as de jure sovereignty
within their own systems of law.116 Their systems of law would include both the
domestic law of each Indigenous nation and the inter-nation law that governed
their relations with one another. The colonizing European nations were not part
of those legal systems and could not have acquired de jure sovereignty by virtue of
them. Instead, the European nations were governed by their own systems of law,
which were also domestic and inter-nation. One can therefore assess the de jure
validity of a European nation’s assertion of sovereignty under its own domestic
law or under the European law of nations, which by the 19th century had become
known as international law despite the fact that most non-European nations
were excluded from its scope.117 In reality, it remained European inter-nation law
throughout the period of colonization of North America.118
I have examined 19th century European “international” law on the
acquisition of colonies elsewhere,119 so will provide only a brief summary here.
After much uncertainty in the law of nations over the adequacy of discovery, papal
bulls, symbolic acts of possession, and so on as means of acquiring sovereignty
over territories that were either vacant or populated by Indigenous peoples whose
113. For a more detailed discussion, see Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties, supra note 2.
114. Powley, supra note 105 at para 37.
115. For more detail, see Kent McNeil, “Indigenous Nations and the Legal Relativity of European
Claims to Territorial Sovereignty in North America” in Sandra Tomsons & Lorraine Mayer,
eds, Philosophy and Aboriginal Rights: Critical Dialogues (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University
Press, 2013) 242 [McNeil, “Indigenous Nations”].
116. This is not to say that Indigenous peoples have the same conception of sovereignty as
Europeans. See Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (Toronto:
Oxford University Press, 1999) at 55-69; Dale Turner, This Is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a
Critical Indigenous Philosophy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) at 57-70; Leroy
Little Bear, “An Elder Explains Indigenous Philosophy and Indigenous Sovereignty” in
Tomsons & Mayer, supra note 115, 6. What I mean when I say that Indigenous peoples had
de jure sovereignty is that they exercised jurisdiction over their territories and peoples in
accordance with their own values, political organizations, and laws.
117. See Morin, supra note 5 at 163-82.
118. See McNeil, “Indigenous Nations,” supra note 115 at 246-47.
119. Ibid. See also McNeil, “Factual and Legal Sovereignty,” supra note 4.
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pre-existing sovereignty was not acknowledged by the European powers,120
by the 19th century a consensus had emerged that effective occupation—the
actual exercise of political jurisdiction and legal authority on the ground—was
necessary.121 In other words, in international law de jure sovereignty followed de
facto sovereignty in these territories, not the other way around. So for the Crown
to have de jure sovereignty in British Columbia under this European legal system,
it would first have had to effectively exercise political and legal authority there.
However, this approach still relied on denial of the pre-existing sovereignty of the
Indigenous peoples, which the Court has now rejected. Moreover, according to
the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Western Sahara
case,122 by the time that part of Africa was colonized by European nations in the
1880s, sovereignty over territory occupied by a people with a social and political
organization, even if they were nomadic, could not be acquired by simple
occupation as if the territory was terra nullius. The sovereignty of Indigenous
peoples has therefore been acknowledged in international as well as in Canadian
domestic law. However, given the Crown’s de facto exercise of sovereignty over
all of British Columbia for many years (albeit later than 1846 in most of the
province), and the acceptance of that sovereignty by the international community,
it is unlikely that an international tribunal would deny de jure sovereignty to
the Crown today. The tribunal might rely on the prescription doctrine (peaceful
and uninterrupted exercise of jurisdiction for a sufficiently long time for it to
confer territorial title) to uphold the Crown’s longstanding exercise of political

120. See supra note 30.
121. See Travers Twiss, The Law of Nations Considered as Independent Political Communities
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1884) at 196-211; Oppenheim, supra note 30 at 275-80;
TL Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, 4th ed (London: Macmillan and Co,
1911) at 148-61; von der Heydte, supra note 30. Since sovereignty involves the exercise of
jurisdiction, effective occupation in this context is not just a matter of physical presence.
Administrative control and enforcement of law are essential ingredients of the effective
occupation required for de jure sovereignty in international law. See William Edward Hall,
A Treatise on International Law, 8th ed, by A Pearce Higgins (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1924) at 139-40; Lindley, supra note 30 at 139-51; Crawford, supra note 6 at 221-23. For
applications of this approach see Island of Palmas Case (1928), 2 RIAA 829; Legal Status of
Eastern Greenland Case (5 April 1933) 2 PCIJ (Series A/B) No 53, 22; Minquiers and Ecrehos
Case, (1953) ICJ Rep 47.
122. Supra note 6.
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and legal authority, but this is by no means certain, as acquisition of sovereignty
by prescription depends on acquiescence by the displaced sovereign.123
Turning to domestic law, in British law relating to the acquisition of colonies,
otherwise known as colonial or imperial law, acquisition of overseas territory is
within the prerogative of the Crown over foreign affairs.124 Moreover, domestic
courts are unwilling to judge the legality of Crown assertions of sovereignty,
which they classify as acts of state that are outside of the jurisdiction of the
courts.125 So although domestic courts acknowledge asserted Crown sovereignty,
this does not mean it is legal. This helps to explain the Canadian case law we
have examined in this review essay: Cases such as Calder, Guerin, Sparrow,
and Delgamuukw simply assume Crown sovereignty without inquiring into its
legality. In Delgamuukw, the Court accepted a certain date, 1846, as the time
when the Crown asserted sovereignty in British Columbia because a date had to
be specified for proof of the exclusive Indigenous occupation required to establish
Aboriginal title. Then in Haida Nation and Taku River, the Court demonstrated
that it was becoming uncomfortable with unquestioned Crown sovereignty,
given the realization that Indigenous nations in the province had sovereignty (de
facto, and de jure under their own systems of law)126 prior to British colonization.
Not wanting to rule on the legality of Crown sovereignty, which due to the act
of state doctrine is supposed to be outside the jurisdiction of domestic courts,
Chief Justice McLachlin described the Crown’s sovereignty as de facto. But that
characterization failed to explain how the Crown could have acquired sovereignty
in 1846 when it was not, in fact, in political and legal control of most of the
123. See DHN Johnson, “Acquisitive Prescription in International Law” (1950) 27 Brit YB of
Int’l L 332; RY Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1963) at 20-28; Yehuda Z Blum, Historic Titles in International
Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) at 6-37; Surya P Sharma, Territorial Acquisition,
Disputes and International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) at 107-19; Crawford,
supra note 6 at 229-35; Shaw, supra note 53 at 364-66; Michael Asch, On Being Here to Stay:
Treaties and Aboriginal Rights in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) at
38-41. Moreover, as pointed out by Asch, even if the Crown were found to have sovereignty
in international law, this would not mean it is morally right or legitimate (ibid).
124. Post Office v Estuary Radio, [1968] 2 QB 740 at 753, 1 WLR 1396 (CA) [Estuary Radio];
New South Wales v Commonwealth of Australia, [1975] HCA 58, 135 CLR 337 at 388, 490;
Roberts-Wray, supra note 6 at 116.
125. Estuary Radio, supra note 124; R v Kent Justices Ex p Lye [1967] 2 QB 153, 1 All ER 560 at
564; Adams, supra note 110 at 583, 585; Mabo, supra note 99 at paras 31-32. On the act of
state doctrine, see Harrison W Moore, Act of State in English Law (London: John Murray,
1888); McNeil, Common Law, supra note 99 at 161-80; Hoehn, supra note 2 at 38-44.
126. On these systems of law, see John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2010) [Borrows, Indigenous Constitution].
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province. In Tsilhqot’in Nation, she reverted to unquestioning acceptance of
Crown assertion of sovereignty in 1846, ignoring the fact that the de facto
sovereignty she referred to in Haida Nation and Taku River could only have been
acquired later.
As Tracey Lindberg and Felix Hoehn have so ably demonstrated in Discovering
Indigenous Lands and Reconciling Sovereignties, Canadian law faces a crisis over
the unresolved tension between pre-existing Indigenous sovereignty and asserted
Crown sovereignty.127 The moral foundations of this country are called into
question by continuing reliance on the false racist assumptions that Indigenous
peoples were inferior to Europeans and therefore not sovereign at the time of
European colonization.128 Hoehn asserts that a new paradigm is urgently required
to resolve the crisis, based on the principle of equality of peoples. Acknowledging
the equality of the Indigenous peoples involves recognizing that they had
pre-existing sovereignty that could not be taken away unilaterally by the Crown.
Indigenous sovereignty, though impaired by the Crown’s imposition of its own
de facto sovereignty and ignored by the courts until Chief Justice McLachlin’s
decisions in Haida Nation and Taku River, continued de jure under their own legal
systems. We are thus faced with a situation today where the Crown exercises de
facto sovereignty and claims de jure sovereignty domestically and internationally,
while Indigenous nations have de jure sovereignty under their own systems of law
and demand acknowledgement of their sovereignty in Canadian constitutional
law and international law. Where legal systems are in conflict, resolution of the
127. See also Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Canada’s Residential Schools: The
History, Part 1, Origins to 1939, vol 1 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015),
online: <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2015/trc/IR4-9-1-1-2015-eng.
pdf>. For discussion of reliance on the doctrine of discovery to justify European assertions of
sovereignty, see ibid at 15-20, 24. See also Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada,
Canada’s Residential Schools: Reconciliation, vol 6 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
2015) at 29-33, 37-38, 42-43, 90, 230-31 (recommending repudiation of the doctrine in
Canada). See especially recommendation 47:
We call upon federal, provincial, territorial, and municipal governments to repudiate concepts
used to justify European sovereignty over Indigenous peoples and lands, such as the Doctrine
of Discovery and terra nullius, and to reform those laws, government policies, and litigation
strategies that continue to rely on such concepts (ibid at 231).

128. See also Walters, supra note 45; Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution
of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) at 107-31; Christie, supra note
94 at 200-04; Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra note 126 at 13-22; Shiri Pasternak,
“Jurisdiction and Settler Colonialism: Where Do Laws Meet?” (2014) 29:2 CJLS 145; Asch,
supra note 123; Arthur Manuel & Grand Chief Ronald M Derrickson, Unsettling Canada: A
National Wake-up Call (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2015) at 108-09, 176-77.
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conflict involves assessment of the matter from the perspective of legitimacy,
which is more a matter of moral values than law. There can be no doubt that
European colonization of North America involved ethical wrongs that undermine
the moral legitimacy of the Canadian state. Unfortunately, history cannot be
redone—we have to move forward from where we are.129 I agree with Lindberg
and Hoehn that this involves accepting the continuing existence of Indigenous
sovereignty and legal systems, and attempting to reconcile them with the reality
of Crown sovereignty through honourable and respectful negotiations. As Hoehn
has argued, this requires a paradigm shift in political and legal thinking in
Canada, a shift that has been courageously initiated by Chief Justice McLachlin.
The reconciliation of Indigenous and Crown sovereignty that she envisaged as
taking place through the treaty process requires Canada to accept the continuing
de jure sovereignty of the Indigenous nations and share de facto sovereignty with
them on a nation-to-nation basis.

129. See Delgamuukw, supra note 81 at para 186. Here, at the end of his judgment, Chief Justice
Lamer put it this way: “Let us face it, we are all here to stay.”

